Of Feminists and Catholics

I find myself currently reading up on the topic of values in science. Is scientific activity value-free, that is, neutral, not influenced by moral, social or political values? So it was believed, for a long time, until in recent years this image of a pristine and other-worldly science has crumbled. Interestingly, this has happened largely under the pressure of feminist critiques, which have made manifest how every form of rational discourse is undergirded by value judgments. Even scientists are social and political animals, operating within a changing web of beliefs, embedded in a particular time and culture.

To a Catholic intellectual, the arguments trying to resist this conclusion sound familiar. “Feminist values are politically-motivated values, and thus non-epistemic … For many critics, these political values are often assessed simply as ‘political agendas’ or ‘political ideologies.’ Feminists are then portrayed as directing scientific inquiry toward predetermined conclusions … [since they] judge scientific results according to ideological standards instead of truth and evidence.” About a century ago, in the heyday of the value-free science ideal, Bertrand Russell decried the seriousness of Christian philosophy in identical terms, when referring to the work of Thomas Aquinas:

There is little of the true philosophic spirit in Aquinas. He does not, like the Platonic Socrates, set out to follow wherever the argument may lead. He is not engaged in an inquiry, the result of which it is impossible to know in advance. Before he begins to philosophize, he already knows the truth; it is declared in the Catholic faith. If he can find apparently rational arguments for some parts of the faith, so much the better; if he cannot, he need only fall back on revelation. The finding of arguments for a conclusion given in advance is not philosophy, but special pleading. I cannot, therefore, feel that he deserves to be put on a level with the best philosophers either of Greece or of modern times.

The history that led to the demise of the value-free ideal is a long and complex one. Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (§89-108, especially §93-96) offer an instance of an early recantation, a rejection of this sublimity and purity once attributed to science and logic. In summary, we may simply say that any intellectual enquiry must start somewhere, so there is no “unconditioned” beginning that is not ultimately rooted in human affairs. The burden of proof lies with those who absolve themselves from any prior assumptions.

Despite the usual stereotypes, it is always pleasant to find oneself in the company of unsuspected philosophical allies.

Image: Helen Longino, one of the pioneers in feminist philosophy of science and pivotal player in the science and values debate (Wikimedia Commons).